Recently, a story has been circulating online about evacuation plans being prepared for natural disasters and crisis situations. In the version spread by Russian trolls, these documents are elevated to the status of “proof” of preparations for population expulsions. This narrative includes the alleged replacement of the population, in which Poles would supposedly be replaced by Ukrainians and Jews, with the entire process already underway and allegedly set to peak on April 22–23, supposedly confirmed by foreign aircraft flying to Poland – specifically to Radom. Has anyone seen any increased activity in Radom? Did any media report expulsions yesterday or today?
Photo: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation
The fact that this is a lie spread by Putin’s supporters is not proven only by the absence of any sudden wave of aircraft landing in Radom. It is enough to look at the starting point. Evacuation plans have existed for years and are part of security management and crisis response. Every public building, shopping center, school, or office building is required to have evacuation procedures. This is not something new, nor is it an element of any extraordinary scenario, but the result of long-standing regulations concerning the protection of human life and health.
There are also markings that can be found almost everywhere: signs indicating evacuation assembly points, exit routes, and safe gathering areas for people after they have left a building. Their purpose is both simple and practical. In the event of a fire, failure, or another threat, they make it possible to quickly check whether everyone has left the facility and whether anyone needs assistance. This is part of routine safety procedures, present in Poland for decades and consistent with standards in force across Europe.
“Evidence”
In this story, it was precisely these signs that became the “evidence.” All it takes is to take them out of context, photograph them, add a suggestive caption, and the material for spreading anxiety is ready. The fact that these signs have been hanging in the same places for years no longer matters. What matters is the narrative, not the continuity of events. And the more common and familiar something is, the easier it is to convince the audience that it has suddenly acquired a new, hidden meaning.
The same mechanism applies to evacuation procedures as such. These are not secret instructions, but mandatory, publicly available documents that must be updated in line with changes in infrastructure and regulations. Building managers do this regularly during technical inspections, safety audits, or facility upgrades. Sometimes this means replacing signs, sometimes updating plans, and sometimes simply adapting them to new requirements. Nothing spectacular, nothing hidden, nothing with a second meaning.
The mechanism at work here is well known and repeatedly used by the Russians. A neutral, or even obvious, element of reality is taken and then given an interpretation that completely changes its meaning. In this way, an ordinary evacuation sign becomes a “signal of preparations for expulsions,” and a standard safety procedure begins to serve as supposed evidence of secret plans against society.
Trust in the state
Behind all of this lies another element highly characteristic of Kremlin operations: undermining trust in state institutions. Once the belief has been planted that even the simplest procedures have a hidden meaning, it becomes very easy to move to the next stage, namely the suggestion that nothing is as it seems. At that point, every piece of information becomes suspicious, every document potentially false, and every action by the administration can be interpreted as part of a larger, covert plan.
And this brings us to the heart of the problem. Narratives of this kind do not need to be coherent or consistent. It is enough for them to be suggestive enough to fall on fertile ground and trigger anxiety. The rest happens on its own, because emotions do their work and online networks replicate content faster than any verification can catch up. As a result, an ordinary information sign can become a tool for building a story about a threat that has no basis in fact.
The worst part, however, is that Polish services do not have the means to penalize lies of this kind or permanently block troll accounts. That is why such information continues to circulate and spread ever wider. And Poland’s three-letter agencies can, in practice, do little more than watch.
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