In practice, this amounted to the bloodiest suppression of demonstrations since the 1979 Revolution. Estimates by independent organizations, HRANA, Iran International, and reports cited by BBC and The Guardian, indicate that between 20,000 and 36,500 people were killed over the entire course of the protests, the majority of them within just two days in early January.
These figures significantly exceed the death toll of the 2019 protests (approximately 1,500) and that of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, during which around 550 deaths were recorded.
>>Situation Update in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Status as of January 26, 2026
>>The Situation in Iran, 2025–2026: An Analysis
Image: Internet
Since January 26, street activity has noticeably declined. The regime imposed a curfew, maintained an internet blackout (reportedly the third longest in global history), and carried out mass arrests. According to HRANA, more than 51,000 people had been detained by early February. Protests were reduced to sporadic student actions (including exam boycotts at medical universities in Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashhad) and demonstrations by retirees and shopkeepers. In response to ongoing government actions, reports also emerged of protests by doctors and nurses. Their resistance has focused on arrests and persecution for providing medical assistance to individuals injured during anti-government demonstrations. Many have treated the wounded secretly out of fear of arrest. The authorities, however, continued their repression; there were reports of injured individuals being abducted from hospitals, secret executions, and forced burials conducted without the presence of families. Such measures appear intended to prevent funerals from turning into further anti-government protests. Security forces repeatedly confiscated bodies from hospitals to bury them in unknown, unmarked locations. In many cases, bodies were transported by truck and buried quickly, without the knowledge of relatives, in an apparent effort to conceal the scale of the repression. More shockingly, families of victims have reportedly been forced to pay large sums of money, sometimes the equivalent of over 20,000 USD, for the release of a body, a practice activists have described as a “bullet fee.” Intimidation does not end there: families are often compelled to sign statements declaring that their loved one was killed by terrorists or opposition groups, rather than by security forces. The government has then threatened arrest if they publicly speak about the circumstances of the death. Yet even here, Tehran has encountered resistance. In response to the repression, some families have attempted to bury their loved ones in private homes or gardens. Another form of defiance has been transforming funerals into “celebrations of life,” where music and singing replace mourning, an act meant to reject the regime’s culture of martyrdom.
A turning point came at the end of January and the beginning of February. On February 9, 2026, forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) arrested leading reformist politicians: Azar Mansouri (head of the Reformist Front), Mohsen Aminzadeh (former deputy foreign minister), Ebrahim Asgharzadeh (an icon of the 1979 Revolution), and Javad Emam. The charges, disturbing public order and cooperating with the United States and Israel, were framed in connection with their criticism of the January 8–9 massacre. On January 26, Mansouri issued a statement describing the actions of the security forces as ruthless and reckless killings of young Iranians. The regime appears to have concluded that even loyal reformists had become a threat to its narrative of a foreign conspiracy. The campaign represents a blow to President Masoud Pezeshkian, whose 2024 election victory relied heavily on reformist support.
Analysts (including Sina Azodi of George Washington University, cited by Al Jazeera) interpret these arrests as the closing of the last remaining space for legal criticism. The regime is not only unwilling to reform but is actively eliminating the possibility of any internal debate. Mir Hossein Mousavi – under house arrest since 2009 – issued a manifesto during this period calling for a constitutional referendum and a departure from the Islamic Republic. Even individuals who assisted in publishing the document were arrested. As Iran expert Marcin Krzyżanowski noted on TVN24, the regime has lost its most powerful weapon – the public’s fear. It is now attempting to restore that fear through terror directed at its own elite.
Economic and Social Situation
The internet blackout, costing the economy tens of millions of dollars per day, combined with sanctions and declining oil exports, has led to a further collapse of the rial (exceeding 1.4 million IRR per USD in early February). Prices of basic goods have risen by 60–80 percent over the past two months. President Pezeshkian’s government attempted to ease tensions through social subsidies, but these proved insufficient and were quickly exhausted. Experts emphasize that the regime in Tehran now faces a dilemma: continued repression deepens the economic crisis, while any concessions to society are perceived as a sign of weakness.
Society has not returned to normal. Families of victims are being forced into silence under threat of losing access to the bodies or facing further arrests. Hospital searches have continued, with injured individuals reportedly taken directly from their beds. As Dorota Słapa, a Polish woman who previously lived in Tehran, recounted, this is no longer merely a protest movement—it is a revolution that has been drowned in blood, but not extinguished.
Pressure on Tehran
On January 26, 2026, precisely as the protests were visibly subsiding, the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group entered the region, accompanied by missile cruisers and destroyers. By the end of January, additional assets had been deployed to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, including the USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., USS Michael Murphy, USS Spruance, and USS Delbert D. Black, as well as F-15E and F-35C aircraft and THAAD and Patriot air defense systems. The Pentagon officially stated that the deployments were intended to deter regional instability and ensure readiness for any scenario.
The redeployment of naval forces appears to serve several purposes.
First, classic deterrence: Tehran received a clear signal from Washington that any attempt at retaliation—for example, closing the Strait of Hormuz—would be met with an overwhelming response.
Second, political support for the protesters: President Donald Trump repeatedly stated that help was on the way and that “we are locked and loaded.” The phrase “locked and loaded” is a traditional military expression in English, meaning that a weapon is armed, ammunition is in place, and it is ready to fire. Its roots date back to military training, particularly in the U.S. armed forces, and the term appears in military literature at least as far back as the 18th century. International relations scholar Kamran Matin described Trump’s wording as an explicit threat that could be interpreted as signaling readiness for military action.
Third, gaining leverage in negotiations through a demonstration of force, coinciding with the start of nuclear talks in Oman on February 6. Iranian sources (cited by Reuters and Al Jazeera) reportedly acknowledged in private that they feared a U.S. strike could reignite protests, this time with even greater intensity. The official Iranian position, presented by the foreign minister, described a positive atmosphere during the talks, emphasizing that arguments were exchanged and both sides’ views were shared. At the same time, Abbas Araghchi dampened hopes for immediate U.S. support for protesters, stating: “Our talks focus exclusively on the nuclear issue, and we are not discussing any other topics with the Americans.”
In response to Donald Trump’s statements, Iran carried out demonstrations of force (naval exercises, attempts by fast boats to approach U.S. vessels, and the downing of a Shahed-139 drone by an F-35C), while simultaneously signaling readiness for dialogue. On February 10, Ali Larijani was reportedly scheduled to travel to Oman to discuss regional solutions.
U.S. Proposals for Resolving the Conflict
The administration of Donald Trump presented Tehran with a package that can be summarized as maximum pressure combined with an off-ramp. The key U.S. demands reportedly included:
- The immediate transfer of 400 kg of uranium enriched above 60% and a return to JCPOA limits (3.67%).
- A freeze on the ballistic missile program and an end to support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.
- Full access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to all nuclear facilities.
- In the longer term, negotiations on a new regional agreement that would include limiting the role of the IRGC.
Although requiring Iran to completely abandon uranium enrichment is unrealistic, there may be room to negotiate a freeze on enrichment activities. As an interim measure, Iran could agree not to resume enrichment-related activities or rebuild/construct new enrichment facilities. However, to explore this possibility, the Trump administration would need to demonstrate flexibility and avoid doubling down on demands for total abandonment. A suspension of enrichment could satisfy Trump’s demands while being more acceptable to Tehran, especially given that the known enrichment capabilities at Natanz and Fordow were reportedly destroyed. Freezing enrichment, combined with the resumption of IAEA inspections, would reduce the risk of Iran advancing toward nuclear weapons capability and lower the likelihood of renewed conflict. Such a freeze could last several years, creating time and political space for negotiations on an agreement that would allow Iran to pursue a peaceful civilian nuclear program under strict limitations and monitoring designed to address legitimate proliferation concerns. This program could include tightly restricted enrichment, possibly linked to specific reactor development milestones – or, preferably, provide time to develop multilateral fuel-cycle arrangements. A multilateral approach would ensure Iran access to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes while reducing the risk that enrichment technology could be diverted to a weapons program.
In the absence of progress, options under consideration reportedly include precision strikes on nuclear and missile installations, cyber operations, and targeted strikes against IRGC commanders responsible for the January 2026 massacre. Experts cited in Polish media note that Donald Trump appears to view the current moment as a historic opportunity for a “smart intervention” – combining air superiority, support for the opposition, and regime isolation without a full-scale ground invasion.
At the same time, Washington has not ruled out negotiations. The talks in Muscat (February 6–10) were indirect, but as a White House spokesperson stated, diplomacy remains possible – although military options remain on the table.
Prospects for Further Developments
As of February 10, 2026, the situation appears as follows: the government in Tehran retains full operational control over the country but has lost virtually all social legitimacy. Repression has shifted into a phase of systematically silencing all criticism, even from within the system, deepening the militarization of the state and creating the first visible fractures among previously loyal elites.
The presence of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group in the Persian Gulf since January 26 functions simultaneously as deterrence and as a powerful instrument of pressure. Indirect talks in Muscat (February 6) and Ali Larijani’s visit to Oman (February 10) indicate that both sides are seeking a diplomatic exit, although the gap between their positions remains substantial.
Three main scenarios are emerging for the coming months:
- The regime survives through terror, but at the cost of further isolation and an almost certain new wave of protests in the spring or summer.
- A combination of external pressure and internal divisions leads to partial concessions and a “soft landing” for part of the establishment.
- Tehran’s refusal to make key concessions triggers a limited military confrontation with the United States.