The U.S. president’s decision represents a potential turning point in U.S.–Iran relations, recalling tensions from previous years, including the aftermath of the 12-day war with Israel in 2025. Speaking on January 22 aboard Air Force One, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that the United States was dispatching an armada toward Iran, emphasizing that the move was a precautionary measure while simultaneously expressing hope that an armed conflict could be avoided. The statement followed reports of the brutal suppression of demonstrations in Iran, where the regime of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues its crackdown on protesters demanding systemic change, including the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.
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>>>The Situation in Iran, 2025–2026: An Analysis<<<
In Iran, President Trump’s statement was met with an escalation of protests. By January 23, reports cited five major explosions in the capital, attributed by opposition sources to acts of sabotage or internal rifts within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In response to U.S. military movements, the IRGC declared full combat readiness, while Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, warned that any U.S. aggression would be met with a full-scale response, threatening a large-scale war and the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for roughly 20% of global oil shipments. By January 24, oil prices had risen by more than 5%, surpassing 90 USD per barrel, reflecting market fears of supply disruptions. Domestically, protests subsided somewhat in certain regions due to internet blackouts and mass arrests, but clashes continued in Tehran and the Kurdish provinces. According to human rights organizations, the estimated death toll exceeded 6,000 by January 25. The Iranian government accused the United States and Israel of fueling unrest, while anti-American murals appeared on walls in Tehran, symbolizing a warning against intervention.
International reactions were swift and varied, reflecting geopolitical divisions. On January 22–23, the United Kingdom confirmed the deployment of RAF Eurofighter Typhoon FGR fighters to Qatar under a defense agreement, reinforcing NATO’s presence in the region. The aircraft were redeployed directly from RAF Akrotiri, Cyprus, and belong to a joint Royal Air Force–Qatar Emiri Air Force unit. The European Union, through a statement by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, expressed deep concern over the military escalation, urging both sides to engage in dialogue and condemning repression in Iran, while stopping short of endorsing U.S. military threats. China and Russia, traditional allies of Tehran, condemned U.S. actions as provocative, with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning of a new conflict in the Middle East that could disrupt global supply chains. Neither the Russian Federation nor the People’s Republic of China has remained passive in response to U.S. actions. In the Persian Gulf, only one Russian guided-missile destroyer, Marshal Shaposhnikov, is currently present, having visited Qatar three days earlier. It is supported in the Middle East by the tanker Boris Butoma, and is likely to be joined soon by the Steregushchiy-class corvette Stoikiy, which participated in exercises off South Africa a week ago and is now heading toward the Arabian Sea. Following the Will for Peace exercises, Iran’s 103rd flotilla, comprising the forward base ship Makran, the corvette Naghdi, and the converted tanker Shahid Mahdavi, is also returning to its home base in Bandar Abbas. According to Defence Security Asia, China has been supporting Iran since January 20. Analysts from the military outlet report that 16 Chinese transport aircraft flew to Tehran within 56 hours. The reported aircraft movements echo observations from June 2025, when aviation experts noted that the aircraft type used is commonly employed to transport military equipment and weapons, raising concerns that the flights may have carried high-value defense systems rather than civilian or humanitarian cargo. At the center of this emerging narrative is China’s Y-20 strategic transport aircraft, a platform symbolizing Beijing’s transition from a regional power to a global military logistics actor. Its involvement would suggest a deliberate decision to use logistical dominance as a geopolitical instrument rather than merely an operational tool. If confirmed, the operation would represent the largest recorded compressed military airlift from China to Iran, surpassing earlier isolated incidents involving 2 to 5 aircraft and signaling a qualitative shift from opportunistic assistance to structured strategic support.
Israel, still mindful of the 2025 war, raised its combat readiness, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating on January 24 that Tel Aviv was prepared for all scenarios, including potential preemptive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. By January 25, reports from United States Central Command confirmed that the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group, along with Tomahawk-armed destroyers and F-15E squadrons, was approaching the Gulf of Oman. Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War interpreted the move as a show of force aimed at deterring the regime from mass executions of protesters.
As of January 26, the situation remains tense but without direct armed confrontation. Protests in Iran continue, albeit on a smaller scale, amid reports of staff evacuations from Iranian embassies in Europe, suggesting regime concerns about a broader conflict. President Donald Trump reiterated that the United States is fully prepared but emphasized a preference for negotiations, which some experts view as an attempt at de-escalation following initial threats. International institutions and think tanks have warned of the risk of uncontrolled escalation that could affect the global economy through disruptions to oil transport and potential nuclear proliferation in Iran.
In the U.S. National Defense Strategy announced on Friday, January 23, the Pentagon underscored that although Iran has suffered significant setbacks in recent months, it appears determined to rebuild its conventional armed forces, while authorities in Tehran are leaving open the possibility of another attempt to acquire nuclear weapons.
In a broader context, these developments highlight the fragility of the regional balance, where Iran’s internal crisis intersects with the global ambitions of major powers, casting doubt on the future of arrangements such as the expired JCPOA. Observers remain on edge, awaiting the next moves on this geopolitical chessboard.
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What is the JCPOA?
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known as the Iran nuclear deal, was signed in July 2015 by Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) under the auspices of the European Union. The agreement aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the gradual lifting of international sanctions, thereby preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons while allowing the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Key provisions included a two-thirds reduction in the number of uranium-enrichment centrifuges (to approximately 5,060), a cap on Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium at 300 kg at a level of 3.67% (well below the 90% weapons-grade threshold), the conversion of the Fordow facility into a research center without enrichment activities, and an extensive inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including on-demand access to military sites. In return, UN, EU, and U.S. sanctions on Iran’s financial, energy, and transport sectors were lifted, allowing Iran to return to global markets, including oil exports.
The agreement entered into force in January 2016. Initially, it produced results: Iran complied with the limits, and its economy rebounded due to an influx of investment and a rise in oil exports from about 1 million barrels per day to more than 2.5 million barrels per day in 2017. However, in May 2018, the administration of President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the JCPOA, arguing that the agreement did not cover Iran’s missile program, failed to prevent so-called sunset clauses (expiring after 10–15 years), and did not address Tehran’s alleged past military nuclear activities. In response, the United States adopted a policy of “maximum pressure” through secondary sanctions, which led to a drop in Iranian oil exports to below 0.3 million barrels per day in 2019 and a deep recession.
Iran initially remained within the agreement, but from 2019 onward, it gradually violated its constraints, increasing uranium enrichment to 60% (close to weapons-grade) and restricting IAEA access. Attempts to revive the JCPOA under the Biden administration in 2021–2022 stalled due to Iran’s demands for guarantees and disputes over missile issues. The final collapse came in 2025: in September, the agreement formally expired after the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) triggered the snapback mechanism in response to Iranian violations, restoring full UN sanctions. “Iran has not taken the necessary steps to allay our concerns, nor has it met our requests for an extension, despite extensive talks,” the E3 stated. In 2026, the implications are severe: Iran is closer to nuclear weapons than ever before (with estimated breakout time measured in months), escalating regional tensions, especially with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and undermining the global nonproliferation regime.
Impact on Oil Markets
The collapse of the JCPOA had both immediate and long-term effects on global oil markets, in which Iran, holder of the world’s fourth-largest proven reserves (approximately 157 billion barrels), plays a key role. Before 2015, sanctions limited Iran’s exports to around 1 million barrels per day, driving prices above USD 100 per barrel in 2014. Implementation of the JCPOA in 2016 enabled exports to rise to 2.8 million barrels per day in 2017, contributing to a price decline of around 20–30% and stabilizing the market through additional supply. The U.S. withdrawal in 2018 reversed this trend: secondary sanctions on Iran’s oil, banking, and shipping sectors reduced Iranian exports to below 0.5 million barrels per day in 2019–2020, pushing prices up by 10–15% and increasing market volatility, particularly amid tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran circumvented sanctions by maintaining a shadow tanker fleet and exporting oil to China (accounting for 90% of Iranian exports in 2024), reaching levels of 1.5–2 million barrels per day in 2024–2025. However, following Trump’s 2025 victory and the reimposition of strengthened UN sanctions, exports fell to around 1 million barrels per day. Combined with current tensions in the Persian Gulf, including threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, this drove prices from 80 USD per barrel in December 2025 to over 95 USD per barrel in January 2026. Rising prices are fueling global inflation, particularly in oil-importing regions such as India and Europe, where energy costs have increased by 5–10%. In the long term, sanctions are constraining investment in Iran’s oil sector (with production declining from 4 million to 3 million barrels per day), limiting global supply and supporting higher prices, while also encouraging diversification of sources, such as increased production in the United States and Saudi Arabia.
A potential military escalation could push prices to 120–150 USD per barrel, disrupting supply chains and deepening a global recession, as analysts from CSIS and the Atlantic Council warned. In the context of the current crisis, the JCPOA remains a symbol of a missed opportunity for stabilization, with oil markets acting as both beneficiaries and victims of geopolitical turbulence.
As of January 26, 2026, the situation has not changed significantly compared to the previous week. Protests in Iran continue, with some sources claiming they could lead to the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, while others suggest they may result in expanded civil liberties. Their actual scale is challenging to assess due to limited information from Iran and the internet blackout imposed by authorities in Tehran. Protesters see an opportunity in U.S. involvement, while the government looks to support from its traditional allies, China and Russia. Both states, however, appear unwilling to support their ally in a direct conflict with the United States should one occur, just as they did not support the government in Venezuela during the recent U.S. intervention. The situation remains fluid, but an escalation driven by growing violence against the opposition and a rising death toll could lead to further escalation.